Richard V. Spencer: Integrated Naval Force, Eddie Gallagher, and the Philosophy of War
Richard V. Spencer served as the 76th United States Secretary of the Navy from 2017 to 2019. He also briefly served as Acting Secretary of Defense and Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2019. Sec. Spencer’s term as the Navy Secretary was terminated on November 24, 2019, when Secretary of Defense Mark Esper requested his resignation over his handling of the Eddie Gallagher case. Sec. Spencer stated in the resignation letter that he “cannot in good conscience obey an order that I believe violates the sacred oath I took in the presence of my family, my flag and my faith to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” We discuss this case in this interview, as well as the state of the Navy, competition with other military powers, investment in human capital and frontier military tech, and the philosophy of war.
We start the interview by asking Sec. Spencer about his long and successful career. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1976 to 1981 as a Marine Aviator. He also worked many years on Wall Street and eventually became the Vice Chairman and CFO of Intercontinental Exchange, a Fortune 500 company, from November 2001 to January 2008. Where did his interaction with the military start? How did he wind up being the Navy Secretary? Sec. Spencer recounts his service on the Defense Business Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, from 2009 to 2015, and on the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel as a businessman. His unique insights on military affairs and long-term working relationship with former Defense Sec. Jim Mattis eventually led to his appointment of the Navy Secretary.
In Sec. Spencer’s appearance at the Brookings Institution in October 2019, he cited The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) as “bordering on revolutionary.” CPG serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. We discuss the 38th CPG and go over some of the ideas outlined there and elaborated by Sec. Spencer in his Brookings keynote address.
Sec. Spencer is particularly passionate about naval integration, a major priority he had when it comes to force design. What was his vision for the Integrated Naval Force structure? “It’s not Navy, it's not Marine Corps… It's the goal of my direction in complete concert with the CNL and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to have one single, unified service,” said Sec. Spencer in the Brookings keynote. He elaborates on this idea in our interview.
In addition to the Integrated Naval Force, there is also the vision for more decentralized command and control at the tactical-level for the Navy, namely composite warfare (CW). The CPG has written about how the Marine Corps must prepare to operate within this doctrinal construct, and also how the continued evolution of the future operating environment is towards Distributed Operations (DO), where DO capable forces are a critically important component of Marine Corps modernization. What is this idea of decentralized, or distributed, structure of operations? How is it critical in the future of military force design and competition? We go in depth on the ideas of decentralization and distribution for the Navy’s future.
Another area we touch on is future force development. The CPG mentioned how the Marine Corps must be able to “fight at sea, from the sea, and from the land to the sea; operate and persist within range of adversary long- range fires; maneuver across the seaward and landward portions of complex littorals.” Hence, the amphibious fleet and littoral maneuver craft would require significant future force development, such as developing a “hybrid” amphibious ship to transport landing craft and enable the ability to fight in a contested littoral. Is this the most important priority these days?
What are some of the other projects that we should care about? One may be surprised to not see more written about more “futuristic” technologies and weapon platforms, such as rail guns, lasers, unmanned weaponry, etc. Sec. Spencer hence elaborates on the role of these technologies and how he envisions future warfare.
We ask Sec. Spencer to recount the Gallagher case from his point of view – What unfolded? What was the decision making process he went through?
This is a quick recap of some of the details based on the materials our team has researched, mostly based on various media sources like the NYTimes: Under a grand jury, Gallagher was acquitted of murder but convicted for posing the photo with the dead enemy soldier. As a result he was demoted for a full rank. Rear Admiral Collin Green, who was the former commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command and de facto the head of SEALs on both coasts, came in as a reformer since the SEALs force was plagued by certain instances like drugs and even murder. Green saw Gallagher as a bug in the system and wanted to pull the trident from Gallagher, which would be considered as the most severe punishment.
However, he didn’t want to do it before the trial because he didn’t want to influence the jury decision, but then he was surprised that Gallagher wasn’t convicted for some of the more severe crimes by the jury. So at the moment, Green was put in a tricky situation and he didn’t want to look like retribution when he ultimately wanted to pull the trident from Gallagher.
Finally after Gallagher’s appeal process, Green kicked off the process of pulling the trident because he thought enough time had passed and that it was finally the appropriate moment to do so. But before they were able to finish the process, Trump pardoned Gallagher and restored his rank, essentially reverting the jury decision. That put the Navy in a very tricky situation.
Green, nevertheless, saw Trump’s decision differently – he saw no pardon, but just promotion back to the rank, and he thought it would finally be the right time to pull the trident. The aftermath began to unfold when Gallagher’s lawyer went on Fox News in the morning after Green finally pulled Gallagher’s trident and portrayed the incident as the Navy rebelling against the Commander-in-Chief’s order. An hour after the Fox News show aired, Trump tweeted that he wouldn’t let that happen. Gallagher also went on Fox News and accused Green for meddling in his case, and things became much muddier afterwards.
The NYTimes reported that on Nov. 24, 2019, Trump tweeted “have no fear; all will end well for everyone,” and a few hours later Sec. Spencer was fired after his superior, Defense Sec. Mark Esper, learned that he had made a secret proposal to the WH allowing Gallagher to retire as a SEAL. In a letter to Trump acknowledging his termination, Spencer stressed his belief in the importance of "good order and discipline", saying, "Unfortunately, it has become apparent that... I no longer share the same understanding with the Commander in Chief who appointed me, in regards to the key principle of good order and discipline. I cannot in good conscience obey an order that I believe violates the sacred oath I took in the presence of my family, my flag and my faith to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” What transpired from Sec. Spencer’s vantage point during these days and weeks? He shares some of the details of negotiations you had with the WH and the DoD.
The Gallagher case brings out a number of interesting political and ethical questions. For example, when the President sees injustice, he is supposed to overrule the military’s decision given the structure of “civilian oversight of the military.” But the Gallagher case is a tricky situation when the Navy tries to enforce ethical rules but the President says it’s ok to go against the rules. Was President Trump justified in carrying out his actions? How should we think about this moral tension more generally?
We eventually end the interview with more general discussions on the philosophy of war and the institution of military. We ask Sec. Spencer whether he thinks that the concepts of force and counterforce are inherently embedded in civilizations, namely that forces and counterforces would always exist in societies, either because of some component of human nature, or because of some inefficiencies of human organization that will inevitably lead to violence and evilness (force) and the deterrence of violence (counterforce). What would be the normative or philosophical frameworks that he personally rely on, or at least learn from, as he reasons through circumstances where he has to decide the use of force? How do we construct systems of government that do not push us towards more war or at least fairer applications of force, especially as our military technology advances more and more?
Richard V. Spencer